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RECONSIDERING VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SELECTION 
Carl W. Tobias * 
The 2008 Virginia General Assembly adjourned this summer 
without electing judges to vacancies on the State Corporation 
Commission (the "Commission" or "SCC"), the Supreme Court of 
Virginia, and numerous circuit courts. Thus, Democratic Gover-
nor Tim Kaine recently appointed practicing lawyer and former 
SCC counsel James Dimitri to the Commission, Court of Appeals 
of Virginia Judge LeRoy Millette to the supreme court, Chester-
field Circuit Judge Cleo Powell to the opening created by Judge 
Millette's elevation, and numerous attorneys as circuit court 
judges. Although the jurists whom the Governor appointed seem 
very well-qualified, the judges may only serve for five months, un-
less the 2009 General Assembly elects them. The 2008 Assembly's 
failure to elect judges for these vacancies demonstrates that the 
selection process is ineffective, and perhaps broken, as this devel-
opment has eroded the delivery of justice and may have under-
mined public respect for judicial selection. The process for choos-
ing judges, therefore, deserves reassessment to ascertain whether 
the system merits reform. This piece undertakes that effort. 
This article first evaluates the origins and development of Vir-
ginia's procedure for appointing judges. This analysis determines 
that Virginia and South Carolina are the only jurisdictions that 
currently select judges through a process of legislative election. 
The examination also discerns that the Old Dominion has em-
ployed this system throughout most of its history since the Amer-
ican Revolution. The regime concomitantly operated rather effica-
ciously for much of the time when one major political party 
* Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Hamil-
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controlled the governorship and both houses of the General As-
sembly. Moreover, the review finds that legislators and additional 
observers have articulated, evaluated, and discussed various sug-
gestions for change over the years and that the Assembly has re-
cently instituted or experimented with some, but it has perma-
nently adopted very few. 
The second section assesses recent developments which impli-
cate judicial selection in the Old Dominion. The section finds that 
increasing partisanship and divisiveness have attended the 
process for choosing judges, especially with the rise and growth of 
a real two-party system as well as divided government in Virgin-
ia. The portion shows how the experience in the 2008 General As-
sembly-which failed in one regular and two special sessions to 
elect judges for numerous vacancies, despite a plethora of oppor-
tunities to name the jurists-suggests that the system is ineffec-
tive, if not beyond remediation. 
The final section, accordingly, explores numerous recommenda-
tions for future treatment of judicial selection in Virginia. This 
part descriptively evaluates the benefits afforded and disadvan-
tages imposed by the processes that many other states employ 
when choosing members of the bench. The section concludes by 
proffering a number of solutions which appear to hold the great-
est promise for improving Virginia judicial selection. 
I. THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SELECTION 
The origins and development of judicial selection in the Old 
Dominion might seem to warrant relatively little exploration in 
this paper, as that background has been treated elsewhere.1 Non-
etheless, considerable analysis is appropriate because this ex-
amination should inform appreciation of the problems that arose 
historically when naming judges, of the recent complications, and 
of possible remedies for those difficulties. 
1. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1975); W. Hamilton Bryson, Judicial Independence in Virginia, 
38 U. RICH. L. REV. 705 (2004); J. Amy Dillard, Separate and Obedient: The Judicial Qua-
lification Missing from the Job Description, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2007); Alex B. Long, An 
Historical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and West Virginia, 18 J.L. 
& POL. 691, 730-66 (2002). 
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Throughout much of Virginia's history, the Commonwealth has 
essentially followed the judicial selection regime that the state 
presently employs.2 This system provides for the General Assem-
bly to elect judges unless a vacancy occurs when the legislature is 
not in session or the Assembly adjourns without electing judges to 
openings.3 In those circumstances, the Governor appoints the 
judge, who serves until the next legislative session at which time 
the Assembly may either elect the gubernatorial appointee or 
someone else. 4 
Virginia and South Carolina are the only jurisdictions in the 
United States that authorize their legislatures to elect judges.5 A 
substantial number of jurisdictions employ some form of popular 
election, although certain states prescribe initial gubernatorial 
appointment with subsequent retention elections.6 Moreover, a 
significant number of jurisdictions rely on several types of merit 
selection commissions, which recommend multiple prospects to 
the Governor, who appoints from that group.7 A few states em-
ploy selection regimes that resemble the federal system because 
the jurisdictions have gubernatorial nomination with legislative 
advice and consent.8 
2. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. For analyses that emphasize the earlier history, see 
Bryson, supra note l; Long, supra note 1. For analysis that emphasizes the recent history, 
see Dillard, supra note 1. See generally 2 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 739-46 (1974). 
3. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 7. 
4. See id. 
5. See supra note 2; S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 9, 14. For analysis of South Carolina, 
see Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative Control of Judi-
cial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217 (1998); Kimberly C. Petillo, Note, The Untou-
chables: The Impact of South Carolina's New Judicial Selection System on the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, 1997-2003, 67 ALB. L. REV. 937 (2003). 
6. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judi-
cial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 277 
(2002); Long, supra note 1, at 702--03; LARRY C. BERKSON, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'V, 
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 2-3, http://www.ajs. 
org/selection/docs/Berkson.pdf. See generally ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE 
ABA COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY (2003), http://www.abanet.org/jud 
ind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf. 
7. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 301--02; Long, supra note 1, at 702; 
BERKSON, supra note 6, at 2-3. A commission advises the South Carolina General Assem-
bly. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-10 to -20 (2005). Somewhat analogous panels have been 
used in the federal system. See generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE 
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES 
AND CANDIDATES (1980); ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING 
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1981). 
8. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 300--01; Long, supra note 1, at 702; 
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At various historical junctures, the Commonwealth has relied 
upon elements of several regimes canvassed in the paragraph 
immediately above. The first Constitution of Virginia in 1 776 
provided for the General Assembly to elect appellate judges, who 
would "continue in office during good behaviour," thus essentially 
instituting life tenure, an important constituent of the federal 
system.9 The 1851 Virginia Constitution replaced legislative elec-
tion with election by the voting populace, while the document 
substituted a term of years for the equivalent of life tenure.10 The 
popular election of judges, however, proved to be relatively short-
lived, as the 1870 Constitution provided for General Assembly 
election of all Virginia judges for a term of years with the possibil-
ity of reelection.11 The Commonwealth reinstituted the earlier 
legislative election approach because General Assembly members 
wanted to employ judgeships as political patronage.12 
This system has basically remained intact since 1870.13 Article 
VI, section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that su-
preme court justices and "judges of all other courts of record shall 
be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each 
house of the General Assembly" with justices serving twelve-year 
terms and all other judges serving for eight years.14 The constitu-
tion also states that, if a judicial vacancy occurs "while the Gen-
eral Assembly is not in session, the Governor may appoint a suc-
cessor to serve until thirty days after the commencement of the 
BERKSON, supra note 6, at 2-3; see also U.S. CONST. arts. II, III. 
9. See VA. CONST. of 1776 art. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. art. III; VA. CONST. of 1830 
art. V, § l; Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 300; Bryson, supra note 1, at 711. 
10. See VA. CONST. of 1851 art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 27, 34; see also Bryson, supra note 1, at 
711. "The rejected 1861 Constitution, Art. VI, § 5, would have returned to the 1830 Consti-
tution's principle of tenure in office during good behavior after appointment . . . ." 
HOWARD, supra note 2, at 741 n.5. 
11. See VA. CONST. of 1870 art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13, 14; see also Bryson, supra note 1, at 
712; Long, supra note 1, at 751; supra notes 6, 9, 10 and accompanying text. 
12. See JACK P. MADDEX, JR., THE VIRGINIA CONSERVATIVES 1867-1879: A STUDY IN 
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 92-93 (1970); see also Bryson, supra note 1, at 712. 
13. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; VA. CONST. of 1902 art. VI, §§ 91, 96, 99; see also 
HOWARD, supra note 2, at 739--46. See generally Bryson, supra note 1, at 712. 
14. VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 7. The Constitution of Virginia was last revised in 1971. See 
id. "The Commission on Constitutional Revision considered alternative plans," including 
most that were analyzed supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text, but it "saw no advantage 
to those plans over the method of judicial selection in Virginia." HOWARD, supra note 2, at 
742 (citations omitted). The revision predated the advent of large-scale expenditures in 
judicial elections. 
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[Assembly's] next session ... [and,] [u]pon election by the General 
Assembly," a new jurist shall commence serving a full term.15 
The selection process has generally functioned efficaciously 
when one of the principal parties controlled the Governor's Man-
sion and both houses of the General Assembly, as was true for 
most of the time since the regime's 1870 adoption.16 The proce-
dure for choosing judges has operated less smoothly over the past 
few decades with the rise and expansion of the modern Virginia 
Republican party and the corresponding phenomenon of divided 
government in which the Governor has been a member of one 
party and the other party has possessed a majority in either the 
Senate or the House of Delegates.17 For much of the period when 
Democrats controlled the governorship and both General Assem-
bly houses, Republican senators and delegates had relatively lit-
tle input on the choice of judges. Thus, it should not have been 
surprising that once Republicans secured control of the Gover-
nor's Mansion as well as the Senate and the House, Democratic 
legislators would contribute minimally to judicial selection. 
Over the last dozen years, relations between Virginia Demo-
crats and Republicans in the General Assembly have been con-
tentious, a phenomenon witnessed most relevantly in the gradual 
deterioration of the judicial selection process. For example, in 
1996, the Assembly failed to fill thirty percent of the openings be-
cause of partisan infighting, which allowed Republican Governor 
George Allen to appoint judges for these vacancies once the legis-
lature adjourned.18 The next year, Democrats and Republicans 
vehemently disagreed over the election of someone to fill the su-
preme court vacancy created by Justice Roscoe Stephenson's re-
tirement; the controversy terminated in a stalemate, thus permit-
15. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. If the Assembly adjourns without filling vacancies, as 
happened in 2008, the Governor may appoint judges to those openings. See id. 
16. Professor Bryson found one major historical exception in the 1870s and 1880s, 
which he believes posed a threat to judicial independence; the situation, however, pre-
vailed for a rather short time. See Bryson, supra note 1, at 708-12. See generally 
MARGARET VIRGINIA NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928, at 
110-20 (1947). 
17. For somewhat analogous developments at the federal level, see BENJAMIN WITTES, 
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006); Carl 
Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 
(1998). 
18. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 10; see also Ross MacKenzie, Editorial, On the Grow-
ing Partisanization of the General Assembly, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1997, at F7. 
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ting Governor Allen to appoint the replacement.19 In 1998, the 
parties engaged in a "nine-hour standoff," which left thirty judge-
ships unfilled, although legislators eventually agreed to elect 
judges for practically all of the openings.20 
Once the Republican party captured the governorship and the 
General Assembly, Republicans predictably limited Democratic 
input in judicial appointments, but Republican Senate and House 
members also instituted certain measures that modified the se-
lection process. In 1998, Assembly Republicans and Democrats 
began considering the establishment of an informal Joint Judicial 
Advisory Committee that would screen supreme court and court 
of appeals candidates.21 The fourteen-member Advisory Commit-
tee, comprised of numerous former Republican and Democratic 
leaders, secured background information, financial disclosure re-
ports, and writing samples from candidates and solicited input 
from state and local bar associations.22 Civic organizations and 
citizens then interviewed the prospective judges and submitted 
recommendations to the Assembly for vacancies on the two appel-
late courts.23 In 2000, a joint resolution of both General Assembly 
houses concomitantly requested that the supreme court formulate 
evaluation criteria to assist the Assembly in electing judges.24 
Notwithstanding these modifications, the selection process has 
grown increasingly controversial. Certain observers voiced con-
cern that the program for assessing candidates might threaten 
19. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 11; Long, supra note 1, at 696-97. 
20. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 12; Pamela Stallsmith, 10 Judges Elected; 1 Spot 
Open, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 199B, at AB. 
21. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 12-14; Long, supra note 1, at 697; Margaret Edds, 
Op-Ed., Picking Judges: You Can't Take Rice out of Rice Pudding, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 
5, 2000, at J5. 
22. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 13-14; Long, supra note 1, at 697; Edds, supra note 
21; Ruth S. lntress, Republicans Present 14 Finalists for Judgeships, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 2000, at AB. 
23. See Long, supra note 1, at 697. In 2000, Republican Assembly members also estab-
lished local citizen committees in some localities that would complement suggestions of 
local bar associations. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 13; Long, supra note 1, at 697; GOP 
Forms Judges Panel, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2000, at B4; see also Carl Tobias, 
Senators Worked Together To Fill the 4th Circuit, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 15, 2007, at 
El (analyzing a somewhat analogous federal entity). 
24. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 17.1-100 (Cum. Supp. 2008); H.J. Res. 212, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 2000); Dillard, supra note 1, at 7; Long, supra note 1, at 697. "2009 is the 
first year that judges up for reappointment will have had a sufficient number of perfor-
mance evaluations for legislators to review." Michelle Washington, Lawmakers To Get 
Brief Shot at Filling Judicial Vacancies, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 21, 2008, at Al. 
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judicial independence,25 while others expressed concern that spe-
cific regions of Virginia were neglected or that Republicans domi-
nated the Advisory Committee's membership.26 Indeed, the Re-
publican General Assembly refused to reelect certain judges 
whom earlier Democratic Assemblies had elected.27 The gradual-
ly deteriorating interparty relations worsened in the 2008 Gener-
al Assembly session when the legislature was unable to elect 
judges for more than a dozen vacancies, including openings on the 
SCC and the supreme court. These developments are explored 
next. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The 2008 General Assembly had the opportunity to elect two 
Supreme Court of Virginia justices, two court of appeals judges, 
and numerous circuit court judges. In fairness, Governor Kaine 
had appointed Justice Bernard Goodwyn to the supreme court 
and Judge Millette to the court of appeals when vacancies mate-
rialized after the 2007 Assembly session had adjourned.28 Moreo-
ver, Justice Steven Agee did not officially resign from the su-
preme court until July 2008, while Judge Millette's court of 
appeals seat only became vacant when Governor Kaine appointed 
the jurist to the opening that Justice Agee's resignation created.29 
Nonetheless, Republicans initially withheld their support for Jus-
tice Goodwyn and Judge Millette, although the 2008 Assembly 
eventually elected them.30 Moreover, President George W. Bush 
25. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 18-29; Long, supra note 1, at 698; Matthew Dolan, 
State Looks at Ways To Judge the Judges, VIRGINIAN·PILOT, Jan. 29, 2001, at AL 
26. See Long, supra note 1, at 698; Edds, supra note 21; Laurence Hammack, Lawyer 
Wins Judgeship on Merits of His Case, ROANOKE TIMES, May 30, 2000, at Bl; see also 
Washington, supra note 24. 
27. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 18-29; Cindy Clayton & Matthew Dolan, Former 
Deputy Prosecutor in Line for Norfolk Bench, VIRGINIAN·PILOT, Feb. 20, 2001, at Bl; Mi-
chael Sluss, Judge's Plight Sparks Debate, ROANOKE TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al; see also 
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
28. See Anita Kumar, Kaine Appoints Circuit Judge to Supreme Court, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 11, 2007, at B6; Anita Kumar & Sandhya Somashekhar, Va. Senate Panel Rejects 
Tax-Relief Plan That Passed Last Year, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at Bl; Jerry Markon, 
Sniper Judge Is Named to Appeals Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2007, at B4. 
29. See Jerry Markon, U.S. Appeals Court Gets New Judge, WASH. POST, July 31, 
2008, at VAl; Neil H. Simon & Jeff E. Schapiro, Agee Wins OK from Senate, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, May 21, 2008, at B3. 
30. See Kumar & Somashekhar, supra note 28; Jerry Markon, Sniper Judge Takes 
Seat on Top Va. Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at PW3 [hereinafter Markon, Sniper 
Judge]; Jeff E. Schapiro, Kaine To Fill Judgeships Amid Lawmaker Gridlock, RICH. 
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had nominated Justice Agee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in mid-March of 2008, to which the Senate con-
firmed the jurist in May; thus, the 2008 Assembly could rather 
easily have anticipated and provided for the supreme court va-
cancy that Agee's elevation created.31 
The 2008 Assembly had myriad opportunities to elect judges 
because the Virginia Senate and House of Delegates convened in 
one regular session and two special sessions. For example, nu-
merous media outlets reported that legislators had reached an 
agreement regarding certain vacancies and even reported the 
names of some prospects whom the Assembly was considering for 
the openings.32 The Democratic Senate and the Republican 
House of Delegates, however, were ultimately unable to forge 
consensus while Republicans in both chambers seemingly disa-
greed among themselves.33 
When a vacancy occurs while the General Assembly is not in 
session, or when the Assembly adjourns without electing judges 
to fill empty positions, the constitution assigns the Governor ap-
pointing responsibility.34 Because Republicans have not commit-
ted to supporting Governor Kaine's choices, the well-qualified jur-
ists whom he appointed will serve five months without the 
assurance that the 2009 Assembly will elect them.35 This uncer-
tainty presumably reduced the eligible candidate pool for these 
crucial judicial offices. Although considerable prestige and busi-
ness-generating publicity may attend someone's short-term ap-
pointment to high level offices-such as sec commissioner, su-
preme court justice, and court of appeals judge-numerous 
qualified attorneys might be unwilling to disrupt their practices 
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 11, 2008, at A5 [hereinafter Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock]. 
31. See Future Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary-llOth Congress, http://www.us 
courts.gov/ctapps/webnovada/CF _FB_301/archived/futurevac10_01_08. (last visited Oct. 
24, 2008); see also supra note 26. 
32. See, e.g., Anita Kumar, Bickering in Va. General Assembly Leaves Judicial Posts 
Open, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at CS; Jeff E. Schapiro, Lawmakers Approve Bond Bill, 
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2008, at Al; Julian Walker, Legislators Near Deal on Se-
lecting Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 9, 2008, at Bl. 
33. See Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock, supra note 30; Julian Walker, Lawmakers Fail 
To Reach a Deal on Naming Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 10, 2008, at B3. 
34. See VA. CONST. art. VI,§ 7; supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
35. See Markon, Sniper Judge, supra note 30; Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock, supra 
note 30. 
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for possible election.36 Sitting judges would be even less willing to 
accept elevation and risk losing their judicial positions. 
Even though Governor Kaine skillfully navigated the obstacles 
described above, this judicial selection process is ineffective. A re-
gime that intrinsically shrinks the number of eligible candidates 
and inherently allows protracted vacancies lacks efficacy. The 
sec operated for nine months absent one commissioner, impos-
ing pressure on the remaining two members and the Commission 
staff. The supreme court similarly functioned over two months 
with a vacancy. Both entities and the court of appeals will oper-
ate for five months with lingering uncertainty about the new ap-
pointees' tenure. The circuit courts have employed substitute 
judges who are less familiar with the courts' procedures, tradi-
tions, and staff, which delays case resolution and reduces efficien-
cy.37 These developments have impaired judicial operations, un-
dermining the delivery of justice and public respect. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Because Virginia's regime for appointing judges is apparently 
less effective than it could be, the Commonwealth should evaluate 
several ways to reform this system. The possible alterations may 
be categorized into near-term, comparatively mundane devices, 
which can usually be implemented by passing legislation, and 
relatively dramatic techniques, most of which require constitu-
tional amendment. 
A. A Short-Term Measure 
One measure that the Old Dominion could adopt in the near 
term is a merit selection commission that would recommend mul-
36. See Jeff E. Schapiro, Kaine Fills 2 Court Spots, One on SCC, RICH. TIMES· 
DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2008, at Al; Carl Tobias, Kaine Can Thread Judicial Needle, RICH. 
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 22, 2008, at A9; see also Editorial, Week's End, RICH. TIMES· 
DISPATCH, July 12, 2008, at AlO. 
37. See Julian Walker, Wheels of Justice Grind Slower over Shortage of Judges, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 4, 2008, at Bl; see also Tobias, supra note 36. On October 7, 2008, 
Governor Kaine announced the appointment of three judges to fill vacancies on the Circuit 
Court for the City of Norfolk. Julian Walker & Michelle Washington, Kaine Appoints 
Three to Norfolk Circuit Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 8, 2008, http://hamptonroads.com/ 
printJ483226. The court had functioned for months without one-third of its nine judges, 
and the court's clerk called the appointments "'long overdue."' Id. 
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tiple, excellent candidates whom the General Assembly in turn 
could elect.38 When evaluating the advisability of a panel, legisla-
tive members might want to consult the accumulated experience 
of the states and the federal government, which have used ana-
logous entities.39 The Assembly may correspondingly think about 
issues such as commission composition, panel members' terms, 
who should be the chair, whether the commission must submit a 
minimum number of candidates, and whether the legislature may 
reject the names tendered and request additional candidates.40 
More specifically, this panel should be comprised of highly quali-
fied judges, legislators, attorneys, and citizens whom the Assem-
bly and the Governor appoint. The panel might also include seats 
that are designated for specific interests, as is prescribed for cer-
tain Virginia agencies.41 
The idea warrants serious consideration because many of the 
fifty jurisdictions and the federal government have successfully 
deployed commissions principally to advise governors when ap-
pointing judges and presidents when submitting judicial nomi-
nees.42 Virginia has employed a similar panel;43 observers criti-
cized the approach, however, arguing that the commission was 
less balanced than it could have been and might have compro-
mised judicial independence. 44 Thus, the Commonwealth should 
ensure that the panel has diverse membership, especially vis-a-
vis political party affiliation, geography, race, and gender, and 
has the requisite expertise, professionalism, and resources to 
avoid threatening judicial independence.45 
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. When the Governor exercises judicial 
appointment power, the official should consider using a panel, although time restraints 
might limit its efficacy. 
39. See supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text. 
40. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 306; see also infra note 41 and accom-
panying text. 
41. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1302 (Cum. Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-
102 (Repl. Vol. 2004); VA. CODE ANN.§ 62.1-44.9 (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
42. See supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text. 
43. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
44. See supra notes 25--26 and accompanying text. 
45. See supra notes 24, 40-41 and accompanying text. 
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B. Longer-Term Measures 
Virginia may also wish to consider longer-term, more dramatic 
alterations that would replace General Assembly election with 
various alternatives, although legislators might be understanda-
bly reluctant to relinquish the authority they currently possess to 
elect judges. Perhaps the most promising option is gubernatorial 
nomination, which many jurisdictions require to be premised on 
merit selection panel recommendations with legislative advice 
and consent. 
This notion deserves careful analysis, as it provides safeguards 
against gubernatorial overreaching through the merit selection 
commission and Assembly rejection of nominees found unquali-
fied, thus preserving legislative authority and the balance of 
power among the three branches. The idea mirrors the federal 
system, which has operated rather efficaciously for more than two 
centuries, although the federal approach has recently experienced 
the same partisanship and divisiveness that have plagued the 
Virginia Assembly's election of judges.46 Nonetheless, the concept 
warrants exploration because the federal regime has generally 
proven efficacious. The Governor and the legislature, therefore, 
should attempt to increase bipartisanship to defuse the politiciza-
tion that has recently suffused Virginia judicial selection because 
these efforts improve the process, safeguard judicial indepen-
dence, and enhance public respect for all three branches.47 
The popular election of judges is another major alternative that 
numerous states have long applied, even though the system is 
less ubiquitous than it used to be.48 This scheme has obvious su-
perficial democratic appeal because the regime allows the people 
to elect members of the bench directly. Many observers, however, 
have articulated a growing number of, and increasingly persua-
sive, criticisms of judicial elections. For example, when judicial 
candidates accept campaign contributions from lawyers and par-
ties who litigate cases before them, this creates the appearance of 
impropriety, while judges' reliance on this money and political 
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
47. See, e.g., Christopher Peace, As Statesmen, GOP Should Confirm Governor's Pick 
for SCC, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 2008, at E4; Jeff E. Schapiro, Path to Naming 
Judges Can Be Rocky, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 2008, at B2. For additional support 
for this measure, see Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 304; ABA, supra note 6, at 
70-73. 
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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party support threatens judicial independence.49 When candi-
dates assume positions on social or political issues, this analo-
gously undermines the perception of impartiality.so The lack of 
instructive information conveyed in judicial campaigns concomi-
tantly leaves voters uninformed, while the distasteful rhetoric ex-
changed undercuts public confidence.51 Most of these factors dis-
suade numerous qualified attorneys from seeking judicial office.52 
Therefore, the approach is not viable, and the Commonwealth 
should eschew it.53 
These longer-term reforms are comparatively far-reaching and 
their institution would require amendment of the Constitution of 
Virginia.54 Therefore, the Assembly may want to invoke the ve-
nerable study commission process, which legislators have long 
employed to analyze a number of particularly difficult complica-
tions and formulate efficacious solutions.55 A study commission 
should comprehensively assess the dilemma that judicial selec-
tion currently presents, consider a broad spectrum of promising 
solutions, and recommend various improvements which the 
people of Virginia might concomitantly adopt through the consti-
tutional amendment process.56 
If the Commonwealth finds the longer-term reforms too drastic, 
the General Assembly should at least seriously consider the 
short-term merit selection panel idea broached above or create a 
study commission to evaluate the notion. Should legislators nev-
ertheless reject both of these approaches, they must institute 
49. I rely substantially here and in the remainder of this paragraph on Behrens & 
Silverman, supra note 6, at 277-79; ABA, supra note 6. 
50. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 292-94; Mary Libby Payne, Mis-
sissippi Judicial Elections: A Problem Without a Solution? 67 MISS. L.J. 1, 9-25 (1997). 
51. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 290-91; Nathan S. Heffernan, 
Judicial Responsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1031, 1044-45 (1997). 
52. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
973, 995-96 (2001); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 285-87; Heffernan, supra note 
51, at 1036-37, 1044. 
53. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, should Virginia decide to adopt popular 
elections, the Commonwealth should at least prescribe initial General Assembly election 
or gubernatorial appointment and subsequent retention elections. See supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
54. See supra notes 2, 14-15 and accompanying text; see also Behrens & Silverman, 
supra note 6, at 308. 
55. See VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES R. 20 (2008); VA. SENATE R. 19(a), (i) (2008). 
56. See VA. CONST. art. XII. 
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measures that will depoliticize the selection process and enhance 
bipartisanship.57 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 Virginia General Assembly's failure to fill numerous 
vacancies by electing judges has impeded judicial operations and 
undercut public respect, while this development suggests that the 
selection process is ineffective and merits remediation or ameli-
oration. Therefore, the Commonwealth should carefully explore 
numerous alternatives which may improve the selection of 
judges. 
57. See supra note 4 7 and accompanying text. 
